improve Security review a bit

This commit is contained in:
Xuan Son Nguyen
2026-08-01 17:48:31 +02:00
parent b2e895327e
commit 37e22b750e
+1
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ Mandatory on every review; any finding here is **blocking**. Rule of thumb: GGUF
- **Sizes/counts from tensor dims:** validate before allocating. Products like `ne[i]*nb[i]`/nbytes can overflow on crafted dims into an undersized alloc then heap overflow. Overflow checks must run BEFORE the arithmetic they guard - padding/alignment macros wrap to 0 near `SIZE_MAX`, so a guard after the pad passes.
- **GGUF strings/arrays:** cap declared lengths and element counts before using them to size a loop or buffer; validate element type and length before casting an array to a pointer or reading fixed indices (`[i+1]`, `[0..2]`).
- **File-supplied counts indexing fixed arrays:** bound any count (e.g. layer/block count into a `LLAMA_MAX_*` array) before indexing; watch checks that only fire when an optional key is present.
- **Declared vs actual array length:** check the declared length of a GGUF array against the count actually read, not just against a buffer size.
- **Bounds comparisons:** flag narrowing casts (`size_t`->`int32_t`) and signed/unsigned mixing that can bypass a length check and copy past a buffer.
- **Parsed/derived indices:** range-check `stoi`/`atoi` results and catch parse throws; never use a default or derived token id (EOS/BOS/...) as an index without a bounds check.
- **Reused/reserved buffers:** recheck bounds after a buffer is shrunk or reused; watch `reserve()` then index-by-assumed-size, and header fields read before their length is checked.